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I.

INTRODUCTION

Paradoxically, contracts are both never complete and always complete. 1
Contracts are never fully complete, because some contractual incompleteness is
inevitable, given the costs of thinking about, bargaining over, and drafting for future
contingencies. 2 In addition, contracting parties may sometimes leave contracts
incomplete on purpose, either because one or both of the parties withhold
information necessary to complete the contract, or because the parties have
determined to “agree to agree later.”
At the same time, contracts are always obligationally complete, because in
order for a court to enforce the contract, it must conclude that the material terms are
sufficiently complete that the intent of the parties can be determined. In such a case,
the court will opt to gap-fill any incomplete terms. In this sense, contracts are
always complete, since either the court will fill any incomplete terms for the parties
or the contract is not enforceable. 3
When parties enter into a complete contract, they specify—optimally—
their rights and obligations in every future state of the world. Because the original
contract lays out the optimal set of obligations and rights in every future
contingency, the parties never need to alter obligations in light of new information
or the resolution of uncertainty. In other words, they never renegotiate or breach
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See infra notes __ (Part II.A.) (discussing “obligationally incomplete” and “contingently
incomplete” contracts). We do not dispute the notion that contracting parties can allocate
even unforeseen risks contractually by doing so at a broad level. See George G. Triantis,
Contractual Allocation of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L. J. 450, 468 (1992). Instead, we contend that the RSI
default proposed here promotes the cost-effective allocation of such risks at a more precise
level.
2
Some contracts are more prone to incompleteness than others. Specifically, long-term
contracts or contracts that attempt to memorialize a set of intricate obligations on the part
of the parties may be subject to both more uncertainty as to future conditions and greater
complexity in the nature of what is required of the contracting parties. Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1981)
(defining “relational contracts”).
3
Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete
Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, n.25 (arguing that, “by its legal definition a ‘contract’
cannot be incomplete”).

1

2006]

ARTICLE TITLE

2

the contract. As noted, however, parties fail to reach such contractual completeness
for a variety of reasons, meaning that contracting parties frequently renegotiate,
breach, and litigate as new information becomes available and unforeseen events
unfold.
Economists and legal scholars long have recognized that this inevitable
contractual incompleteness creates two types of investment problems:
underinvestment and overinvestment. Both of these investment problems are
measured against the efficient investment level—that is, the investment level that
maximizes the gains from the contractual arrangement.
Incomplete contracts present a danger of underinvestment because, to the
extent that the parties’ obligations are not optimally specified in the contract, an
opportunity arises to renegotiate those obligations in the future. This renegotiation
raises the prospect of opportunistic behavior – during renegotiation, one or both
parties may attempt to garner a higher fraction of the gains from continuing to trade.
If the parties can easily switch to alternative bargaining partners, then both can walk
away from the existing relationship and these attempts at hold-up will fail.
However, the greater the relationship-specific investment that a party has made in
contemplation of performing on the agreement – for example, non-recoupable
expenditures, information sharing, specialization, training, etc. – the more
vulnerable she will be to hold-up attempts by her partner. Recognizing this, parties
will be reluctant to engage in relationship-specific investment in the face of
contractual incompleteness, unless some resolution to the hold-up problem can be
found.
On the other hand, coupled with a damage remedy, contractual
incompleteness also can lead to overinvestment. In some future contingencies, the
parties are better off not trading, even though the contract requires them to do so. In
this state, the damage remedy guarantees the investing, nonbreaching party a certain
return, even though the investment has no social value (the parties will not be
trading and the investment only has value if the relationship continues).
Anticipating this guaranteed return, the contracting party may invest too heavily in
the relationship.
Economists have analyzed at length the mechanisms for avoiding the
potential inefficient investment problems that accompany contractual
incompleteness. The mechanisms typically suggested are complex contractual
arrangements 4 or asset ownership—i.e. the firm. 5 The complex contractual

4. Philippe Aghion et al., Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information, 62
ECONOMETRICA 257 (1994); Tai-Yeong Chung, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments,
and Risk Sharing, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 1031 (1991); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts
and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 98 (1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach
Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996).
5. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 29-33 (1995);
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Benjamin Klein et al.,
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L.
& ECON. 297 (1978). But see R. H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General
Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15, 16 (2000) [hereinafter Coase, Acquisition] (arguing there is no
evidence that a holdup occurred); R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning,
Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm] (expressing
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arrangements are rarely observed in practice, 6 and it is well recognized that asset
ownership is not always a practical response to contracting problems. 7
Given the dangers of inefficient investment created by contractual
incompleteness, and the limited practicability of the drafting and ownership
solutions, what can the parties do, or more specifically, what can contract law do, to
approximate the incentives and investment levels that would be reached in the
presence of a perfectly complete contract? In this Article, we argue that, although
contract law may be unable to replicate the optimal contract envisioned by
economic models, it can reduce the problems of inefficient investment associated
with incomplete contracts.
As noted, because an incomplete contract is unenforceable unless a court
chooses to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the contract, a contract – if it legally
exists at all – is never really obligationally incomplete. This alone, however, does
not resolve the potential for inefficient investment associated with incomplete
contractual arrangements. Unless courts choose to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities
in a manner that minimizes the incentives to over- or underinvest, contracts that are
completed by courts will not mitigate problems of inefficient investment and may
even exacerbate them.
We propose a default rule of contractual gap filling and interpretation (an
“RSI default”) that applies to incomplete contracts only when one of the contracting
parties has made a relationship specific investment (an “RSI”). Subject to a notice
requirement, the RSI default fills gaps and resolves ambiguities in the contract in
favor of the party making the RSI. 8 As a result, it allocates bargaining power during
renegotiation of the contract to the investing party. By allocating renegotiation
power to the contracting party most likely to fall victim to hold up (that is, the
relationship specific investor), the RSI default encourages contracting parties to
make such investments.
In addition, because the RSI default must not encourage inefficient overinvestment, we propose that, in order to gain the benefit of the RSI default, the
relationship specific investor must provide notice of such investment to the noninvesting party. 9 The notice requirement reduces the incentive to over-invest or
skepticism regarding the importance of vertical integration in addressing problems of asset
specificity and arguing that satisfactory contractual solutions exist to the holdup problem).
6
Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 859 (2003) (“The contracts that the models predict do not exist
in the world.”).
7
Goetz & Scott, supra note 2 at 1094; Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of
Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L. REV. 91, 96, 120 (1979); Oliver E.
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 PA. L. REV. 953, 970-72 (1979).
8
We address the informational burden on courts making this inquiry infra section V. The
court doesn’t have to perfectly observe or verify investment levels for the RSI default to
increase contractual surplus. All that is needed is for the court to observe a signal
correlated with the investment
9. Under the notice requirement, the parties do not contract directly on investments
(which, if they could, would render the whole investment problem moot). Instead, one party
proposes a broad (and perhaps nonquantifiable) investment plan. The other party wants to
induce the investment but cannot make a contractual commitment directly on that
investment. So, instead, by not objecting to the plan, the noninvesting party triggers the
RSI default. This is a credible commitment to refrain from causing a holdup because,
under the default, all interpretation disputes are decided in favor of the investing party.
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behave strategically (when a party invests in the relationship simply to trigger the
RSI default). If the proposed investment is inefficient—the investment is unlikely to
create a surplus that the parties can divide up through side payments—the
noninvesting party can object. Furthermore, the notice requirement encourages
contracting parties aware of a contractual gap or ambiguity to share that information
with their contracting partners. As such, the RSI default encourages contracting
parties to address significant contractual incompleteness at an early stage, and to
address the incompleteness on their own through renegotiation or contract language
clarification. Even in cases where this renegotiation fails, the RSI default and notice
requirement serve to reduce the level of wasted relationship specific investment, by
forcing litigation at an earlier stage than might otherwise occur.
We do not claim that the RSI default replicates what the parties could
achieve through perfect contracting. Instead, we contend that contract law itself,
through a careful application of good faith, interpretation, and gap-filling, can
mitigate the investment obstacles inherent in incomplete contracts. And, in many
cases, this will be a more cost-effective mechanism than either asset ownership or
complicated contractual arrangements. In addition, the RSI default provides the
added benefit of lending guidance to courts faced with allegations of opportunism
and bad faith. As discussed in Part III.B. of this article, courts struggle with the
issue of good faith. What is it? How is it defined? Fortunately, economists have
studied the conditions under which threats are credible and opportunistic behavior is
likely to occur. We employ the insights from this “theory of the firm” literature to
develop the RSI default. 10
Nor does the RSI default perfectly balance the incentives to over- and
underinvest. We assume, however, that for most long-term contracts the holdup
effect outweighs the overinvestment effect. That is to say, in most future
contingencies for most long-term arrangements, the parties prefer continuing to
trade. Given this assumption, the RSI default favors the investing party in any
interpretive dispute, provided that notice has been given. In those cases where this
assumption does not hold the parties have two options: (1) a non-investing party
concerned with overinvestment can object at the notice stage, carefully clarifying

With this commitment in hand, the investing party proceeds with the investment plan and
splits the gains from trade with the noninvesting party.
10. The “theory of the firm” has been a focal point of the corporate law scholarly
community. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989). In helping
courts police and uncover contractual opportunism, this Article shows how the theory of
the firm informs more than just corporate law. Another contract scholar, Gillian Hadfield,
has noted the role that good faith can and should play in maintaining investments in one
specific contractual context: franchisor/franchisee contracts. See Gillian K. Hadfield,
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV.
927 (1990). She finds that that the implied good faith standard encourages relationshipspecific investment by the franchisee. Id. at 984-87. This Article’s argument is much
broader. It shows that, whenever one contracting party has made a relationship specific
investment, an analysis of that investment and the resulting renegotiation bargaining
power is critical to any interpretation, gap-filling, or good faith inquiry, no matter the
contractual context.
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the level of investment that she will accept, or (2) write a contract with a large
upfront deposit. 11
The economic justifications for the RSI default are the same as for other
contractual default rules: reducing transaction costs and forcing information. As
with any other default rule, parties can opt out of the RSI default if they anticipate
that investment levels will not be an issue; in fact, the notice requirement
encourages them to do so.
After discussing the reasons for contractual incompleteness, Part II of this
Article places the RSI default in the context of the broader economic and legal
literatures. Part II.A. briefly reviews the holdup problem. Part II.B. describes the
dominant solution to holdups—ownership–and demonstrates that contractual default
rules play a similar role in allocating ex post bargaining power. Part II.C. considers
the overinvestment associated with standard damage remedies and illustrates how
the RSI default guards against this problem.
Part III illustrates the application of the RSI default as compared to
alternative defaults through a discussion of cases and doctrines. Specifically, Part
III demonstrates that the RSI default demands little from courts that they are not
called upon to do already when addressing allegations of bad faith or opportunism,
or when applying many majoritarian default rules. We begin in Part III.A. with the
“agreement to agree”—a classic case of contractual incompleteness. This part
demonstrates the superiority of the RSI default as compared to alternative defaults
in addressing the issues posed by the much-discussed case of Krantz v. BT Visual
Images, L.L.C. 12 Part III.B. demonstrates the relationship between the RSI default
and a good faith inquiry using the specific case of Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil
Corp. 13 Part III.C. discusses the interpretation of requirement and output contracts
more generally, and Part III.D. addresses general rules of contract interpretation.
Part IV provides some preliminary thoughts on the case of two-sided
relationship specific investment, while Part V explores the informational burdens
placed on the courts by the RSI default, arguing that the informational requirements
are manageable. Part VI concludes.

II. OPTIMAL RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT AND THE HOLDUP
PROBLEM
A. The Inevitability of Incomplete Contracts
In the economic model, contracts are “contingently incomplete” because,
under the contractual language, the parties do not maximize the gains from trade in
every future contingency. 14 In the legal model, contracts are “obligationally
incomplete” because, whether deliberately or by accident, contracting parties fail to
fully specify at the outset of their relationship all of their rights and obligations

11. See Edlin, supra note 12, at 99-101 (discussing how parties can use up-front
deposits to counter overinvestment).
12. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see also Robert E. Scott, A Theory of
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1655-57 (2003) (discussing
Krantz).
13. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
14. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992).
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under the contract. 15 Because obligationally incomplete contracts are also
contingently incomplete, the result of an obligationally incomplete contract is that,
in some contingencies, the parties will want to reallocate their contractual
commitments in light of new situations or circumstances not considered in the initial
contract. 16
When neither party has made investments that are specific to the
relationship, they will either renegotiate to reach a mutually beneficial outcome or
will walk away from the relationship. However, when one or both parties have
invested in assets that are relationship-specific and it is in both parties’ interest to
continue to trade, the potential for holdup arises.
By definition, relationship-specific investments lose significant value if the
relationship between the parties does not continue and, as a result, create an
opportunity for exploitation. At the time of renegotiation, a contracting party may
attempt to holdup her partner who has made a relationship-specific investment,
trying to garner a higher fraction of the gains from continuing to trade. Knowing
this, contracting parties will be reluctant to make relationship-specific investments,
even if those investments would increase the surplus generated by the contractual
relationship. Accordingly, inefficient investment may result.

B. The Ownership Solution
The dominant solution offered to the holdup problem is ownership. As
discussed in this Part II.B, ownership addresses the holdup problem by providing
one party ― the owner ― with leverage in contract renegotiation. As a result, such
ownership encourages relationship-specific investments that might not occur in the
absence of this leverage. As we demonstrate in the following Part III.C., however,
contractual default rules create the same renegotiation leverage as ownership and, in
many cases, do so more cost-effectively.
Economists have analyzed at length the holdup problem caused by
contingently incomplete contracts and the extent to which ownership is necessary to
resolve that problem. 17 For example, Oliver Hart approaches the holdup problem by
noting that, because contracts are incomplete, the ex post allocation of power—that
is, the outside options available to a party if the other party does not perform—
affects the outcome of any renegotiation. 18 He notes that, although a contingently
complete contract would perfectly eliminate the holdup problem, because
15. Id.
16. In theory at least, contingently incomplete contracts need not be obligationally
incomplete. However, because most contracts do not have liquidated damages clauses,
most contracts—including contingently incomplete contracts—are obligationally
incomplete. As demonstrated by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, courts can use damages for
breach of contract to address both types of contractual incompleteness, and excuse
doctrines such as impossibility and impracticability perform precisely this function. Id. at
731. Because the focus is on gap-filling default rules, this Article addresses mechanisms for
addressing contingently incomplete contracts only when such contracts are also
obligationally incomplete. As noted, however, this will be the case in most instances.
17. Klein et al., supra note 13 (predicting that vertical integration, rather than
renegotiation, will likely be the solution to postcontractual opportunistic behavior). But see
Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 13 (disputing the need of vertical integration as a
solution). See generally HART, supra note 13, at 73-88 (discussing in detail the hold-up
problem).
18. HART, supra note 13, at 2-4.
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contingently complete contracts do not exist, ownership of assets is an important
source of power that enhances one’s relative position during renegotiation.
To see how the power of residual control rights can mitigate the holdup
problem, consider the example of GM and Fisher Body. 19 In 1919, Fisher Body
signed a ten-year contract under which it agreed to supply car bodies to GM, which
GM then turned into final automobiles. 20 According to the traditional account,
unexpected increases in the demand for GM cars during 1925-26 provided an
opportunity for Fisher Body to hold up GM over the price that Fisher could charge
GM on sales exceeding the number covered in the original contract and by a refusal
of Fisher Body to locate its production facilities closer to GM in order to keep costs
down. 21 As a result, the GM-Fisher Body contractual relationship broke down
during 1925-26, culminating with GM’s acquisition of Fisher Body in 1926.
Roughly speaking, there were three possible ownership structures that
could have governed the GM-Fisher Body relationship: the two firms could be
independent, as was the case until 1926; the two firms could integrate, with GM
buying all the capital assets of Fisher Body, as it did in 1926; or Fisher Body could
purchase all the assets of GM. 22 Hart demonstrates that the various potential
ownership structures present different ex post allocations of power. When GM owns
Fisher, GM is the party with power during renegotiation. 23 As a result, Fisher’s
threat of holdup is substantially reduced and GM will be more inclined to invest in
the relationship. In contrast, Fisher’s renegotiation power is substantially reduced.
As a result, Fisher may be reluctant to make investments that pay off only if its
relationship with GM continues. 24
In summary, although the holdup problem may lead to underinvestment,
holdup problems can be mitigated if the party subject to the holdup has sufficient
19. There is a great deal of debate over whether the Fisher Body-GM incomplete
contract is really an example of attempted holdup. Compare Klein et al., supra note 13, at
308-10 (using GM-Fisher Body to illustrate the vertical integration solution to the holdup
problem), and Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L.
& ECON. 105 (2000) (defending the GM-Fisher Body example against critics), with Coase,
Acquisition, supra note 13, at 18-19 (contending that Klein errs in his description of the
facts of the GM-Fisher Body case), Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, The
Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & ECON. 67 (2000) (arguing that Fisher Body-GM is not an
example of the holdup problem), and Robert F. Freeland, Creating Holdup Through
Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & ECON. 33 (2000) (same).
20. Klein et al., supra note 13, at 308.
21. Klein et al., supra note 13, at 308-10. As noted supra note 30, the traditional
account is disputed.
22. HART, supra note 13, at 30-33.
23. To be precise, Hart’s model focuses on relationship-specific investments in human
capital. HART, supra note 13, at 31-33. These investments are made by the management of
Fisher or GM. If GM owns Fisher, GM can replace the management and run the car-body
factory itself. Id. at 31. If GM and Fisher are independent, GM does not have this option
because it lacks access to the physical capital of Fisher. Id. Ownership increases GM’s
outside options because it can continue to produce car bodies (with a new management
team at Fisher), even if the contract with Fisher fails. Id. at 31-32. Without ownership, in
the event the contract between GM and Fisher fails, GM has to build a new car body
factory to fulfill its needs. Id.
24. Since ownership by one party precludes ownership by the other party, Hart
demonstrates that only the second-best amount of relationship-specific investment is
possible. Id. at 51. Further, Hart shows that integration is optimal when the physical
assets are complementary, and nonintegration is optimal when the physical assets are
independent. Id. at 50-53.
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bargaining power during the renegotiation stage. Although ownership is one
mechanism for allocating this power, it is not the only mechanism. As will be
shown in the following Part II.C., contractual default rules may also play this role. 25

C. The Impossibility of Incomplete Contracts—A Theory of Default
Rules
Although contracting parties inevitably leave gaps and ambiguities in
contractual language, contracts are never really obligationally incomplete. As
discussed in this part, whenever contracting parties fail to sufficiently specify their
rights and obligations under the contract, contract law does it for them—either
affirmatively by imposing obligations and filling gaps, or negatively, by refusing to
impose affirmative obligations and fill contractual gaps. As a consequence, contract
law default rules allocate bargaining power during renegotiation in much the same
way that ownership does.
To illustrate, consider the example of a contract for the sale of goods in
which the parties specify the quantity of goods to be delivered, the date of delivery,
and all other terms other than the price. If the seller’s cost of performing under the
contract increases, she may seek to avoid delivering under the contract. By charging
the court to fill in a “reasonable price,” U.C.C. § 2-305 completes the contract for
the parties. 26 Because of the gap-filler, the buyer can demand delivery at a
reasonable price and sue the seller for breach of contract if she fails to deliver.
The default rule in this case allocates some power to the buyer during the
renegotiation of the price term and, in so doing, sets the starting point for new talks
and discussions. Although the parties may end up agreeing to a higher price than the
default price, especially if the buyer has made relationship-specific investments or
the damage remedy for breach by the seller fails to make the buyer whole, the
“reasonable price” default rule sets the parameters of the renegotiation, providing
the buyer with some leverage.
The extent of that leverage will depend on a variety of factors, including
the parties’ expectation about how the court will define the term “reasonable price.”
In this manner, the set of default rules allocates bargaining power among the parties,
dictating how much power each has during renegotiation. For example, a definition
of “reasonable price” that accounts for the seller’s increased costs provides the
buyer with less leverage than a rule that defines “reasonable price” in a manner that
fails to account for the seller’s altered cost of performance.
Alternatively, assume that the same buyer and seller fail to specify the
quantity of the good to be delivered but do specify a sale price. Again, if the seller’s
cost of performing under the contract increases, she may seek to avoid delivering
25. This Article does not imply that ownership and court enforcement are the only
mechanisms for dealing with holdup problems. The role of extralegal enforcement
mechanisms, such as reputational constraints, reciprocity concerns, and repeated
interactions, in reducing holdup are well noted in the literature. See, e.g. HART, supra note
13, at 66-68 (noting that long-term contracts are self-enforcing until unexpected changes in
market conditions cause one party to turn to the courts); Scott, supra note 24, passim
(discussing self-enforcing contracts). Indeed, scholars have shown that extralegal sanctions
can sometimes allow parties to completely opt out of the legal enforcement of contracts.
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
26. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003).

2006]

ARTICLE TITLE

9

under the contract. By setting the default for unspecified quantity terms at zero, the
UCC essentially directs courts to find that there is no contract. Yet, this holding also
completes the contract by allocating bargaining power during renegotiation to the
seller.
If the buyer still wants the seller to deliver the goods, she will have to pay
the seller enough to compensate her for the increased cost of delivery. If suitable
substitutes are available, the buyer may choose to purchase the goods from another
seller instead, but if the buyer has made relationship-specific investments, this
option, too, may be unattractive. In short, the bargaining power of the parties will
depend on (1) the contractual default rule, (2) the parties’ relative relationshipspecific investments, and (3) the ease of finding alternative contracting parties
during the renegotiation stage. 27

D. The Overinvestment Problem
As discussed in Part II.B., economists long have been concerned with
problems of underinvestment and holdup. However, the economic and legal
literature reveals a competing concern for overinvestment—the idea that the damage
remedy might encourage parties to invest too much in a contractual relationship. 28
As is the case with underinvestment, the overinvestment problem stems from the
inability of parties to make complete contracts.
The intuition behind the overinvestment problem is that, under some
circumstances, it will be efficient for one party to the contract to breach or,
alternatively, renegotiate and buy her way out of the contract. This will be true for a
seller, for example, if another buyer offers substantially more for a good than the
good is worth to the original buyer. If the parties can renegotiate without cost, they
will make the efficient breach decision no matter the legal remedy. However, the
27.Although we believe that, as a general rule, courts and commentators have
insufficiently explored the role of relationship-specific investment and holdup problems
when struggling with theories of contractual default rules, we do not write on an entirely
clean slate. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 25, at 729-30 (arguing that courts could
use gap-filling default rules to address economists’ concerns over contractual
incompleteness and demonstrating how the choice of default rule could impact contracting
parties’ strategic reluctance to enter into contingently complete contracts); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1114
(1981) (proposing that courts interpret best efforts clauses as an obligation to invest at the
joint maximization volume—i.e., at the level that would be attained in the integrated firm
― and specifically analogizing the role of gap-filling default rules to the role of vertical
integration); Edlin & Reichelstein, supra note 12, 478 passim (showing how the
appropriate quantity choice can, under certain conditions, perfectly balance the
overinvestment and underinvestment incentives); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to
Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS L. REV. 389, 411-20
(proposing a pro-defendant default rule that protects partial agreements, arguing that
such a default rule: better reflects the intent of the parties; permits parties to break down
big commitments into smaller, more palatable commitments; and, most importantly for our
purposes, promotes relationship-specific investment.).
28. See William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 47-49 (1984) (showing that expectation and reliance
damages induce overinvestment, even if the parties can renegotiate the contract); Steven
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 469-72 (1980)
(analyzing overinvestment and breach decisions, assuming parties cannot renegotiate).
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contractual remedy may distort the parties’ investment decisions and lead to too
much investment.
Overinvestment occurs when it is efficient ex post for the parties to trade
less than the contract specifies. If the contract is then enforced through a damage
remedy, the investing party gets a return on his investment, even though the
investment lacks social value. Trade with someone else is optimal; yet, the
relationship-specific investment has value only if the two original parties continue
to trade. 29 In a complete contract, the investing party would account for the fact
that the investment lacks value in some future contingencies and invest less. 30
Accordingly, if they are to encourage the optimal level of relationship-specific
investment, contractual default rules must not only address the underinvestment and
holdup problems, but they must be sensitive to problems of overinvestment as well.
The RSI default performs both of these functions better than existing
default rules. As noted, the RSI default encourages relationship-specific investment
by construing incomplete contractual terms in favor of the relationship-specific
investor. At the same time, three aspects of the rule avoid exacerbating the
overinvestment problem.
First, the notice requirement of the RSI default provides the noninvesting
party with bargaining power in the relationship as well. This is because the
investing party gains the benefit of the default only if she has advised the
noninvesting party of her plans to make such an investment and the noninvesting
party does not object. This notice condition provides the noninvesting party with
some leverage during renegotiation and should cause the investing party to hesitate
before investing too much in the relationship. Indeed, only when the investment will
create a surplus that the parties can share will the noninvesting party sign off on the
investment. Otherwise, the noninvesting party has an incentive to object. When the
noninvesting party fails to object, she essentially binds herself not to holdup the
investing party and, instead, sells her right to holdup in return for some side
payment. It is the noninvesting party’s ability to commit that creates the additional
gains from trade. 31
29. Edlin and Reichelstein show that, when parties set price and quantity in a
contract, the parties themselves can balance the overinvestment and underinvestment
problems, even if they cannot contract on the investment levels. Edlin & Reichelstein,
supra note 12, at 482-91. The authors demonstrate that, when only one party makes a
relationship-specific investment, the optimal quantity—the quantity selected by the
parties ex ante—perfectly balances these two effects under either expectation damages or
specific performance. Id. When both contracting parties make relationship-specific
investments, specific performance (and the appropriately selected contract quantity)
achieves the appropriate balancing, assuming certain conditions. Id. at 491-94. The Edlin
and Reichelstein proposal, unlike the RSI default, cannot help parties who fail to specify a
quantity term or who cannot determine which quantity term perfectly balances the two
effects.
30. For an example, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 33-37 (3d ed. 2003).
31. The notice decision and resulting investment can happen at any point in the
relationship. If, for example, circumstances change three years into the contractual
relationship that make an investment profitable, a party can provide notice at that point in
time. Notice can even occur at the time of contract formation. Notice can be actual or
constructive. Actual and constructive notice requirements are woven throughout property
and contract law. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b)(2003)(requiring the seller to notify the
buyer if the shipment of non-conforming goods is an accommodation rather than an
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This notice idea is not foreign to contract law. Rather, it mimics the waiver
and estoppel doctrines. 32 In a loan contract, for example, if the lender repeatedly
accepts late payment on the debt without objection, some courts will find that the
lender has implicitly “waived” the payment condition. 33 Alternatively, the court
might find that the lender is “estopped” from using the late payment as grounds for
acceleration of the debt. 34 Under either doctrine, the failure to object prevents the
lender from strictly enforcing the condition. Similarly, under the RSI default, if a
party fails to object to an investment, it forfeits the ability to use that investment to
later holdup the other party.
Second, the overinvestment problem rests on an assumption that the
damage remedy fully protects the nonbreaching party’s expectancy interest: that is,
the theory assumes that damages make the nonbreaching party indifferent between
performance and breach. In reality, this assumption is rarely satisfied. Litigation
costs, specifically attorney fees, make it expensive to pursue a contract claim. Under
the American system, these costs are not recoverable. In addition, the proof
requirements for damages—that is, certainty and foreseeability—reduce the
nonbreaching party’s recovery. Because of these aspects of the damage remedy, the
nonbreaching party is rarely fully compensated. 35 This lack of full compensation
reduces the expected return on specific investment, reducing the incentive to invest
too much.
Finally, as Aaron Edlin has demonstrated, parties can control
overinvestment themselves through up-front deposits. 36 Such deposits ensure that
the noninvesting party sues for breach and the investing party pays damages. These
litigation positions impact the investment calculus. To see how this works, suppose
acceptance); U.C.C. 2-706(3)(2003)(requiring a seller to notify the buyer if it intends to
engage in a private resale to mitigate the cost of the buyer’s breach); WILLIAM B.
STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.10 (3d ed. 2000)(describing
the legal requirements needed to become a bona fide purchaser, one of which is the absence
of constructive or actual notice of a prior unrecorded conveyance). As such, a court could
use the same factual inquiry to decide notice under the RSI default as is done in these
other areas of law.
Finally, we have implicitly assumed that the investing party makes a single,
anticipated investment or series of investments in the relationship. But, in many longterm relationships, a party will make a series of investments, not all of which can be
anticipated, e.g., in year one of the contract, the seller locates its plant near their
contracting partner; in year two, the seller redesigns its transport capacities to fit the
buyer’s need; in year ten, the seller retrofits all of her equipment to serve the same buyer.
The notice requirement in this situation becomes more problematic. Does the seller have
to give notice and get consent from the buyer to each discrete investment decision? We
think that notice and consent regarding the last investment choice should govern the
applicability of the RSI default. If the seller secures consent to this last investment, the
RSI default applies. If the buyer had not consented to the previous investments, the seller
can still purchase RSI default before the last investment. The side payment will be higher
than in the single investment case because the buyer is giving up a more substantial holdup power, created by the prior investments.
32. On the subtle differences between these two doctrines, see JEFFREY FERRIELL &
MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS 434-43 (2004).
33
See, e.g., Morgan v. Bryant, 673 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Mo.App.1984).
34. See, e.g., Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Morgan, 850 S.W.2d 297, 299-300 (Ark.
1993).
35. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case
Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1448-49 (2004).
36. Edlin, supra note 12, at 99.

2006]

ARTICLE TITLE

12

that the noninvesting party makes a large deposit on the contract. Completing
performance, then, is cheap for the noninvesting party; it only involves a small
payment. As a result, the noninvesting party has little incentive to breach. If it
occurs at all, breach will be the result of the investing party’s failure to perform.
The investing party is then on the hook for compensatory damages. After paying
these damages, any left over surplus—the residual—goes to the breaching party, the
investor. Because the deposit makes the investing party the residual claimant, she
refrains from excessive investment.
Edlin also shows that the parties can counter the underinvestment problem
by specifying a contract for delivery of a high quality or large quantity of the
good. 37 In this case, it is never efficient to trade more than the contract specifies; so,
underinvestment ceases to be a problem.
However, the RSI default is superior to the high quality/large quantity
method of addressing the overinvestment problem in two important respects. First,
a contract containing the optimal quality and/or quantity term proposed by Edlin
may be quite costly and, in some cases, even impossible to write. It requires the
parties to set a quantity and/or quality at a level where they will never want to trade
more than the quantity or quality initially specified. This may be a very difficult
task at the time of contract formation. The RSI default, in contrast, does not require
the parties to even consider the underinvestment problem at contract formation.
Instead, the court provides the commitment device after the fact. Second, Edlin’s
high quality/large quantity solution to underinvestment does not work in cases
where the parties do not specify a quantity or quality. In many contractual
contexts—such as agreements to agree and requirement and output contracts—the
parties do not agree on quantity at contract formation.
As elaborated in Part I of this Article, however, the RSI default employs
Edlin’s deposit insight to allow contracting parties to limit the impact of the RSI
default. If, despite the notice requirement, the parties anticipate that overinvestment
is still likely to occur, they can use deposits to restrict excessive investment.

III. THE RSI DEFAULT IN PRACTICE—DOCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
Our goal in this Part III is twofold. First, to illustrate the application of the
RSI default through concrete examples using hypotheticals and well-known cases.
Second, to demonstrate the relationship between the RSI default and existing rules
and mechanisms of contract interpretation, including good faith. As will be shown,
rather than increasing the burden on courts, the RSI default can aid courts in
analyzing the types of cases they face everyday, such as allegations of bad faith or
opportunism, by identifying those circumstances in which opportunistic threats are
most credible.
We begin in Part III.A. with the most “incomplete” of all arrangements: the
agreement to agree. Through the example of Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C. 38
we demonstrate the superiority of the RSI default as compared to other defaults,
including standard majoritarian defaults, information-forcing defaults, prodefendant defaults, and the traditional common law rule of non-enforcement. Part
III.B. considers how the RSI default informs good faith and Part III.C. extends this
37. Id.
38. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001);.
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analysis to the specific case of requirements and output contracts. Part III.D.
concludes with a discussion of general contract interpretation. The discussion in
Section III thus moves from the most specific context where the RSI default
applies—agreements to agree—to the most general case of contract interpretation.

A. Agreements to Agree
This section considers, in detail, a case involving contractual
incompleteness that has received much attention from courts and commentators—
Krantz v. BT Visual Images, L.L.C. 39 By examining the likely impact of the case
holding on the problems of relationship-specific investment and holdup, this section
demonstrates that Krantz was correctly decided. However, as in many cases of
contractual incompleteness, the court’s failure to analyze the case in a manner that
accounts for relationship-specific investment and holdup problems thwarts the
development of a clear doctrine to account for the results in indefiniteness cases. As
a result, courts are forced to rely on vague notions of whether the contract is
sufficiently definite or the incomplete terms sufficiently material, undermining
predictability in the law and leading to inconsistent rulings.
In Krantz, both the plaintiff, Krantz, and the defendants, BT, were
marketers of telecommunications systems and components. 40 Beginning in 1994,
the plaintiff agreed to become a distributor for the defendants, purchasing video
conferencing equipment manufactured by BT for resale to customers. 41 Thereafter,
the plaintiff established a sales account with Kaiser Permanente, recommending,
selling, and installing telecommunications products to Kaiser that were
manufactured by the defendants and other companies. 42 Rather than supplying
Kaiser with “off the shelf” products, however, the plaintiff learned to customize
video conferencing equipment for Kaiser, using a variety of component software
and hardware supplied by the defendants and other manufacturers. 43 Eventually, the
plaintiff was able to design a custom video conferencing system specifically for
Kaiser’s use. 44
At the plaintiff’s suggestion, the plaintiff and the defendants agreed to
submit a joint bid to supply twenty-four custom video conferencing systems for
Kaiser’s use in its Kansas City and Denver operations areas. 45 The parties agreed
that the defendants would supply the BT components used in the Kaiser system with
the plaintiff providing any remaining components and assembling and installing the
system. 46 In order to increase its chances of winning the bid, the plaintiff agreed to
reduce its distributor’s fees for the Kaiser bid, and the parties further agreed to share
jointly in all subsequent business with Kaiser and its affiliates. 47 Finally, the

39. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). A Westlaw search on March 4, 2005,
revealed over 200 citations to Krantz. See also Scott, supra note 24, at 1656-57 (discussing
Krantz).
40. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 212.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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plaintiff and the defendants agreed that, in the event their joint Kaiser bid was
successful, they would negotiate product margins and price terms. 48
The plaintiff thereafter shared with the defendants his ideas,
configurations, and designs developed for the Kaiser bid. 49 However, after the
defendants obtained this information, they informed the plaintiff that they would
submit the bid to Kaiser on their own. 50 Although the trial court ruled that this
“agreement to agree” was too indefinite to enforce, the appellate court disagreed
and reversed, reasoning that the parties had no choice but to draft an indefinite
agreement because “it remained to be seen whether the joint proposal would be
accepted.” 51
Analyzing Krantz, along with a sample of eighty-nine other cases, Bob
Scott argues that the factor driving these case outcomes is whether the contract is
incomplete due to exogenous or endogenous factors. 52 When the contract is
incomplete due to exogenous events outside of the contracting parties’ control, Scott
notes that courts typically enforce the incomplete contract. 53 By contrast, when
contractual incompleteness is endogenous to the contract—because the parties
inadvertently or purposely ignored verifiable information that could have been used
to complete the contract at relatively low cost—courts refuse to fill in the resulting
gaps and hold the contract unenforceable. 54
However, the court’s ruling can be defended on other grounds
that we believe hold more promise for inducing efficient investment
levels. 55 The plaintiff in this case, by sharing his expertise relating to
Kaiser and its custom video conference needs with the defendants,
made a relationship-specific investment. That investment increased
the total value of the Kaiser bid to all concerned, including Kaiser
(who presumably could receive a better customized end-product due
to the plaintiff’s efforts) and the defendants (whose possibility of
submitting a winning bid was significantly enhanced through the
plaintiff’s sharing of his expertise). When the defendants tried to
holdup the plaintiff by threatening to use the information provided
by the plaintiff to submit their own bid, they deprived the plaintiff of
the value of his relationship-specific investment.
The elements required for application of the RSI default are all present in
Krantz. First, by sharing his acquired expertise with the defendants, the plaintiff
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Because of this threat, the plaintiff agreed to onerous changes in the joint bid
contract that substantially reduced his profits from the venture. Id. at 212-13. Although
the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this point, the
appellate court ruled that the plaintiff had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
duress. Id. at 218.
51. Id. at 218.
52. See Scott, supra note 24, at 1656-57.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1657.
55
It is not clear to us why the information at issue in Krantz—margins and product
prices—was unavailable to the parties simply because they did not yet know whether their
bid would be successful. Admittedly, however, the facts of the case are complicated and not
sufficiently discussed by the court.
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made a relationship-specific investment. In other words, plaintiff’s investment in
acquiring and then sharing with the defendants his knowledge and expertise relating
to Kaiser‘s video conferencing needs loses substantial value unless plaintiff’s
relationship with the defendants continues. This is true even if plaintiff were to
submit a bid on his own or with another partner ― once shared, plaintiff no longer
holds a monopoly on this information. As a result, he must compete with another
bidder (the defendant) and charge competitive rates for products and services that
were developed based on plaintiff’s previously unique expertise relating to Kaiser’s
videoconferencing needs. The plaintiff would not have shared his expertise with the
defendants if he believed that the defendants might later be free to submit a bid to
Kaiser on their own, without compensating the plaintiff in any way for his shared
information.
Second, the plaintiff provided the defendants with the requisite notice. In
fact, the plaintiff informed the defendants at several different stages of their
relationship of his efforts (and eventual success) in developing custom video
conferencing for Kaiser. 56 Later, by sharing his expertise relating to Kaiser’s
specific video conferencing needs with the defendant (a move that quite obviously
would pay off only if the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants
continued), the defendants were fully aware at the time they entered into the
contract that the plaintiff had made a relationship-specific investment.
The Krantz court correctly found that the contract was enforceable. 57 The
RSI default would direct the court even further, however. Under the RSI default, in
determining which product margins and price terms to supply, the court should
construe those indefinite terms in a manner that favors the plaintiff. Examining the
results that would occur in Krantz under the various potential default rules
demonstrates the superiority of the RSI default in this instance.
For the purposes of the following illustrations, assume that the plaintiff and
the defendant each advocate two different credible interpretations of the price and
margin terms, supported by testimony of expert witnesses. 58 The plaintiff’s
interpretation would award the plaintiff $1000 under the contract, and the
defendant’s would award the plaintiff $200 under the contract.
Under the traditional common law approach to indefiniteness, the court
would refuse to enforce the contract, as, in fact, was the trial court’s ruling in
Krantz. 59 In this situation, however, the traditional common law approach is the
worst possible outcome, because it forces the plaintiff to forgo all of the benefits of
his relationship-specific investment. Rather than encouraging relationship-specific
investment, the traditional common law default rule discourages such investment
and encourages holdup.
56. Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
57. See id. at 218.
58. Of course, the best outcome for the defendants is a ruling that the contract is too
indefinite to enforce. Such a ruling would allow the defendants to use the plaintiff’s
acquired expertise, submit an independent bid, and still avoid liability to the plaintiff.
However, the defendants’ next best argument presumably would be to argue for price and
margin terms that favor the defendants. Because the Krantz opinion addresses only the
motions regarding enforcement, we do not know what price and margin terms (other than
nonenforcement) were advocated by the defendants. However, we provide hypothetical
arguments here regarding the preferred price and margin terms of each party in order to
explore and distinguish the application of the various default rules.
59. See Krantz, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 217.
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Similarly, a court applying a penalty default rule, because it believed that
the parties had purposely attempted to shift the costs of completion onto the courts
by leaving the product price and margin terms incomplete, would refuse to enforce
the contract. 60 As under the traditional common law rule, this result discourages
relationship-specific investment and encourages holdup problems.
Under a mimicking or traditional majoritarian default rule, the court would
enforce the contract, filling in price and margin terms that the parties would have
agreed to if they had been able to cost effectively do so. Because the court generally
does not know what the parties would have agreed to, it is likely to apply terms of
commercial reasonableness, trade usage, and the like. In this case, the court might
look to similar contracts to see what other parties in similar contracts might agree
to. However, there may not be sufficient information about similar parties in similar
contracts, especially when one considers the plaintiff’s relationship-specific
investment—the sharing of his information and expertise with the defendants that
permitted the successful joint bid.
Because both parties have credible claims and expert testimony, the court
might simply average the two claims, awarding the plaintiff $600 under the
contract. However, the court has no reliable way of discerning whether this award
reflects the amount that the plaintiff would have demanded in order to be induced
into ex ante relationship-specific investment. If $600 is too low an estimate, then
similar contracting parties will be reluctant to make such investments in the future.
Given the uncertainty on this point, the court should apply the plaintiff’s preferred
terms, provided that they are credible and supported by evidence.
A court applying the pro-defendant default rule advocated by Omri BenShahar would similarly enforce the contract but would fill in the incomplete terms
differently. 61 Under a pro-defendant default rule, the court would allow the plaintiff
to enforce the contract, but the best price term that he could get would be the price
advocated by the defendant, in this case $200. In the present case, this outcome is
even worse than the outcome under a majoritarian rule. The default rule favors the
defendant, even where the plaintiff is the one who has made the relationshipspecific investment. As a result, the defendant is the party with the most ex post
bargaining power and the party most apt to engage in holdup behavior, as occurred
in Krantz. As a result, the plaintiff is the party most likely to be forced to sue in
order to recoup his relationship-specific investment. To construe the contract
against him—while superior to the traditional common law approach of
nonenforcement—actually reinforces the unequal ex post bargaining position of
these parties, rather than improving on it. 62
60. A court might also apply a penalty default rule if it believed one party to the
contract possessed the information necessary to complete the product price and margin
terms but failed to supply the information in the hopes of garnering a larger fraction of the
gains from trade. However, there is no evidence of such information asymmetry in Krantz.
In fact, the court explicitly found that the contract was an “agreement to agree,” implying
that both parties had consented to the incomplete contractual language. Id. at 218.
61. Ben-Shahar criticizes the traditional common law rule that agreements to agree
are unenforceable by demonstrating that such partial agreements may induce parties to
ultimately reach a better, more complete contract. Ben-Shahar, supra note __ at 390-92.
He proposes instead a pro-defendant default rule that protects partial agreements. Id.
62
We recognize that the pro-defendant default is designed to serve other important
purposes and, in the absence of a relationship-specific investment, may be an appropriate
means to address partial agreements. However, in cases in which one party has made an
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Finally, a court applying the RSI default would adopt the plaintiff’s price
terms, here $1000. Because there is some ambiguity as to the benefit that the
plaintiff actually anticipated under the contract, it is possible that this awards the
plaintiff too much. 63 However, by resolving this ambiguity in favor of the party
who has made the relationship-specific investment, the court encourages such
investment. At the same time, the defendants, by knowingly entering into an
incomplete contract with a counterparty who has informed them that he has made a
relationship-specific investment, have already contemplated and agreed to bear the
risk of incomplete contractual terms.
Put another way, if the defendants wanted to avoid having the incomplete
terms construed in the plaintiff’s favor, the RSI default provided them with that
option. At the time that the defendants entered into the contract (already aware of
the plaintiff’s relationship-specific investment), they would have known that any
incomplete terms would be construed in the plaintiff’s favor. As such, the RSI
default puts the burden of attempting to clarify the contract terms on the defendants,
as the non-RSI party.

B. The General Good Faith Obligation
The doctrine of “good faith” in contract law is the subject of numerous
scholarly articles and much judicial hand-wringing. 64 The Restatement (Second)
states, “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” 65 The U.C.C. provides a bit more,
defining good faith as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing.” 66
Unfortunately, these standards provide little traction for a court making a
good faith inquiry. Courts inevitably face the thorny issue of whether certain actions
constitute a violation of good faith. In many cases, the articulation of the good faith
standard turns on opportunism—a concept courts rarely define.67
RSI, this Article urges courts to abandon both the traditional common law rule of
nonenforcement and the pro-defendant default rule in favor of the RSI Default.
63. As noted, the court should analyze only the range of credible interpretations
asserted by both parties. It should not adopt any interpretation advocated by the
relationship-specific investor, regardless of its absurdity and lack of evidentiary support.
Although this requires some fact-finding and judgment by the court as to the range of
credible interpretations, courts already engage in this type of decision-making when
applying majoritarian defaults.
64. See sources cited supra note 9.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
66. U.C.C § 1-201(b)(20) (2003).
67. See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (“‘Good faith’ is a compact reference to an implied undertaking
not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the
time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the parties.”); Jordan v.
Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th
Cir. 1987) (“The element of good faith
dealing implied in a contract . . . is not a version of the Golden Rule, to regard the interests
of one’s contracting partner the same way you regard your own. An employer may be
thoughtless, nasty, and mistaken. Avowedly opportunistic conduct has been treated
differently, however.”); Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (D.N.J. 1995)
(“[The good faith] cases are based on the policy of giving a contract legal effect where the
parties have evidenced an intent to be bound or protecting a reliance interest against a
promisor’s opportunism.”) (citation omitted). The same difficulties arise in the corporate
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The RSI default helps courts formulate and apply the good faith standard
by identifying those instances where opportunism ― in the form of holdup ― is most
likely to occur. By directing courts to protect parties that have made RSIs, the RSI
default provides courts with a better test than the more generalized pronouncements
of the Restatement and UCC. Furthermore, the RSI insight in some ways lessens the
burden on courts confronted with claims of opportunistic behavior. As
demonstrated in Part II.A., contracting parties have an incentive to behave
opportunistically when one party has some ex post bargaining leverage over the
other. That leverage sometimes arises from the fact that one party to the contract
has made a relationship specific investment. In other words, not all complaints of
opportunism by a contracting party are credible and deserving of court action. By
identifying those cases where the incentives to holdup a contracting counterparty
are present, the RSI default restricts the machinery of the good faith doctrine to
cases where protection from opportunism is actually needed to promote efficient
investment.
Take, as an example, the case of Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp.68 In that
case, a supplier of airline fuel, Gulf Oil, entered into a requirements contract with
Eastern Air Lines.69 At certain airports, Gulf Oil was required to supply all of the
fuel Eastern required.70 In turn, Eastern was obligated to buy fuel exclusively from
Gulf Oil.71 As with all requirements contracts, the parties did not specify a fixed
contractual quantity.72 After the government instituted price controls, Eastern
began “fuel freighting.”73 Under this practice, Eastern jets would carry excess fuel
if the price at the Gulf station was higher than the price at the plane’s prior
location.74 In essence, Eastern manipulated its requirements for Gulf Oil. One issue
before the court was whether fuel freighting violated the “good faith” standard
implicit in requirements contracts.75 Yet, like other courts attempting to determine
whether contracting parties have acted in good faith, the Eastern court had no good
test for determining “good faith.”
According to the Eastern court, Gulf found the requirements contract
initially advantageous, because it provided “a long term outlet for a capacity of jet
fuel coming on stream from a newly completed refinery.” 76 However, after the price
of fuel skyrocketed, Gulf sought to renegotiate the price of fuel in the contract. 77
Eastern refused to renegotiate and continued to freight fuel, knowing that Gulf was
in some ways locked into the relationship with Eastern and would have a tough time

context. See Deborah A. DeMott, Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO
Context, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 15, 19 (1990) (“A key component of business judgment
analysis—good faith—has always been a concept arguably unequalled for its malleability
and formlessness.”).
68. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
69. Id. at 434-35.
70. Id. at 435.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 436.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. E. Air Lines v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp 429, 432 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
77. Id. at 431-32. The parties disputed the exact contours of the pricing arrangement,
with Gulf claiming that the assumptions underlying the price mechanisms no longer held
true. Id. at 437-38.
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finding an alternative long-term source for fuel produced by its refinery. 78 In other
words, Eastern had leverage in the renegotiation due to Gulf’s investment in the
refinery – an investment that may or may not have been relationship-specific.
It is not clear from the facts of the case whether the Gulf refinery was built
specifically to fit the needs of Eastern and the court did not attempt to discover this
information. Instead, the court reasoned that fuel freighting was an established
industry practice, as well as part of the Eastern/Gulf course of dealing and course of
performance in other contracts. As such, the burden was on Gulf to ensure that the
contract limited fuel freighting if that provision was desired by Gulf. In other
words, the court found that Gulf had given implied consent to fuel freighting by not
limiting it in the contract.
Note that this ruling places the burden on Gulf to clarify terms upfront.
This burden can be costly given that some conditions are hard to foresee and/or
unlikely to occur. To impose this burden on Gulf, as opposed to Eastern, without an
analysis of whether one party has made a relationship investment that makes them
vulnerable to holdup by their counterparty may exacerbate the incentive for one
party to engage in holdup, rather than reduce it.
A court applying the RSI default, in contrast, would consider information
regarding the parties’ investments in the contractual relationship vital to the case
outcome. If Gulf’s investment had been – or had become – relationship specific,
then (provided that the RSI notice requirement had been met) Gulf, rather than
Eastern, should get the benefit of any ambiguous or missing terms, such as those at
issue in Eastern.
To illustrate, assume that facts were introduced into evidence showing that
Gulf Oil had trained its workforce to work on Eastern jets or located its fueling
stations at the Eastern hubs, and that Gulf had been made aware of these
expenditures and had not objected. Under these facts, a court applying the RSI
default would not allow Eastern to exercise holdup power, and, instead, would
construe any incomplete contractual terms in favor of Gulf Oil. As a result, the
court would find that Eastern acted in bad faith by fuel freighting.
The application of the RSI default thus promotes two important goals.
First, knowing that RSIs are protected by courts in the event of contractual
incompleteness, Gulf is more likely to incur expenses related to a relationshipspecific investment with Eastern to begin with, thus increasing the total value of
contractual relationship for both parties – and economically positive result that
courts should encourage. Second, knowing that courts apply RSI defaults to protect
relationship-specific investments, Eastern is less likely to balk at Gulf’s attempts to
renegotiate the contract in the first place. The RSI default alters the terms of the
renegotiation because the anticipated interpretation of “good faith” reallocates some
of the bargaining power in the renegotiation of the contract to Gulf Oil. By ignoring
the ex post bargaining positions of the two parties and focusing instead on Gulf’s
implied consent to fuel freighting, the court misses an under-appreciated use of the
good faith standard and contract interpretation more generally: the ability to induce
relationship-specific investment. 79
78. Id. at 436-37.
79. Note the analog between the change in bargaining power by contractual
interpretation and the allocation of bargaining position by ownership. To ensure that
Eastern did not holdup Gulf Oil, Gulf Oil could have purchased the assets of Eastern—
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As the Eastern example shows, the RSI default improves the application of the
good faith doctrine. Before invoking the doctrine, the RSI default forces a court to
consider, explicitly, whether conditions for the extraction of rents exist. If not, the
doctrine does not apply. By informing the good faith doctrine with the RSI default,
the court construes incomplete contractual terms, implied and explicit, in favor of
the party making a relationship specific investment, thus removing the leverage
from the non-investing party in the subset of cases where opportunism is likely to
occur.

C. Requirements and Output Contracts
With the Eastern case in mind, let us now turn to requirement and output
contracts more generally. As noted, in these contracts, the parties do not specify
quantity. In a requirements contract, the seller promises to provide all the goods the
buyer requires. The buyer promises to buy exclusively from the seller. In an output
contract, the seller promises to sell exclusively to the buyer; the buyer promises to
buy all of the seller’s output. Despite the lack of a quantity term, the U.C.C.
provides that these contracts are enforceable. Section 2-306(1) provides the
framework:
A term which measures the quantity by the output
of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such
actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith,
except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to
any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to
any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or
requirements may be tendered or demanded. 80

Both requirements and output contracts create the chance for opportunistic
behavior. In a requirements contract, the buyer might demand zero, claiming that
she has no requirements under the contract. The courts have held that such a
demand passes the good faith test if done for a valid business reason. Alternatively,
if the contract price is less than the market price, the buyer might demand much
more than the seller expected, hoping to buy the goods at the lowerrequirement
contract price and resell them at the higher market price. Section 2-306(1) limits this
chance for exploitation by the buyer: The requirement demand cannot be
unreasonably disproportionate to a stated estimate or a comparable requirement
demanded.
Unfortunately, neither “good faith” nor “unreasonably disproportionate”
are well defined concepts in these cases. Here, again, the RSI default could provide
a framework for courts in cases where one party has made an investment specific to
the contractual relationship, giving courts both more specific guidance regarding
integrating the two firms. Then, when the practice of fuel freighting came up, Gulf would
be in a different bargaining posture. Gulf could threaten to fire and replace the
management of its now-subsidiary, Eastern, if it manipulated fuel requirements. In terms
of bargaining power, the RSI default does the same thing, reducing the need for
integration.
80. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2003).
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how to interpret such cases in the event of a dispute and further alerting courts to the
instances where one party has an incentive to behave opportunistically.
Consider a buyer and seller in a requirements contract. After the contract is
signed, the seller informs the buys that he intends to make a substantial investment
in targeting its production to the buyer’s needs and the buyer does not object. Later,
the buyer claims that it “requires” very little, and as a result, will buy from the seller
only if the seller agrees to a lower price. The seller’s investment creates leverage for
the buyer. Because the buyer may now feel “locked into” the relationship with the
seller, the buyer has an opportunity to holdup the seller.
Under traditional applications of the good faith standard, the burden is on
the seller to prove bad faith on the part of the buyer. However, a court applying the
RSI default would consider the parties’ investments in the relationship in reaching a
decision. When, as in this hypothetical, the seller has made a relationship-specific
investment, the court would shift the burden of proof to the non-investing party. In
other words, the buyer must now prove a legitimate business justification for the
decreased demand. Alternatively, if it had been the seller – rather then the buyer –
who made an RSI, the burden would be on the seller to prove bad faith, as it is
under current good faith analysis.
This burden shifting under the RSI default provides a nudge in favor of the
relationship-specific investor. Hence, it alters the renegotiation position, fostering
ex ante decisions to invest in the contractual relationship. At the same time,
overinvestment is limited. The seller must provide notice to the buyer at the time of
the investment that she is contemplating an RSI. At that time, the buyer can clarify
the terms of the requirements contract (establishing a floor and ceiling on its
demand, perhaps) or, alternately, can object, telling the seller not to invest. If the
buyer does neither of these, he has accepted the risk that incomplete contract terms
will be construed against him during any good faith inquiry.

D. General Contract Interpretation
Contract interpretation is a complex topic and the subject of much recent
study by law and economics scholars. 81 It involves many doctrines, including
misunderstanding, 82 the various maxims of interpretation, 83 the parol evidence
rule, 84 and the incorporation and use of course of performance, course of dealing,

81. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, Contracts as Statutes, 104 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics
of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
82. Konic Int’l Corp. v. Spokane Computer Services, Inc., 708 P.2d 932 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1985) (parties have a misunderstanding about the meaning of “fifty-six twenty”);
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864) (parties have a misunderstanding
about the ship name, Peerless); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (1981). On
misunderstanding generally, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.9 (4th ed. 2004).
83. On these maxims generally, see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS § 87 (4th ed. 2001). For a look at the effect of these maxims on the burden of
proof in contract suits, see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Principles of Contract
Design, 115 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
84. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209-10
(1981). For a model of how to apply the parol evidence rule, see Eric A. Posner, The Parol
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and usage of trade to resolve ambiguities and fill in contractual gaps. 85 In addition,
courts sometimes employ various rules of thumb to resolve interpretative disputes:
rules such as “construe against the drafter.”
In this section, we demonstrate that the RSI default can provide useful
guidance to courts when applying these traditional doctrines of contract
interpretation. To illustrate, consider the case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus 86 —a
chestnut of the first-year contracts course. In Raffles, the buyer and seller agreed to
a sale of cotton traveling aboard a ship named Peerless. 87 There were, in fact, two
ships named Peerless carrying cotton—one arriving from Bombay to England in
October, the other in December. 88 The seller shipped its cotton on the December
Peerless and the buyer refused delivery, claiming that the contract called for
delivery on the October Peerless. 89
Concluding that the parties meant materially different things, the court
found that there was no contract. 90 As discussed in Part II.C., this holding
obligationally completes the contract. The court specified the rights and obligations
of the parties (no delivery) under an unforeseen contingency (two boats named
“Peerless”). Because of this ruling, the buyer was not obligated to take delivery, and
his refusal did not constitute a breach.
Of course, it still may be efficient for the parties to trade the cotton shipped
aboard the December “Peerless” and they may, in fact, complete that trade. But the
court’s interpretation puts the seller in a weaker bargaining position during
renegotiation of the contract. The seller, not the buyer, will have to give up
something to induce the buyer to trade in the absence of a contractual obligation.
Alternatively, the court could have found a contract on the seller’s terms—
the December “Peerless.” Now, in contrast, the court’s holding places the seller in a
better bargaining position. So, what should the court have done in the Peerless
case?
Under the RSI default, the court would have considered whether either
party invested in the relationship and, if so, whether the other party had notice of
that investment. If this occurred, the court should construe “Peerless” in favor of
that party. This interpretative move forces the court to confront and mitigate the
underlying problems stemming from contractual incompleteness.
There is no evidence that either party in Raffles made a relationshipspecific investment, nor did the court look for one. At the same time, this was not a
spot transaction. The buyer and seller had a relationship and might have engaged in
and benefited from investment expenditures targeted to the needs of their
counterparty. That said, this contract most likely was about locking in the future
price of cotton, with the buyer and the seller each betting the spot price would move
in their preferred direction. If this were true, the concerns informing the RSI default
– reducing holdup and encouraging relationship-specific investment – are not
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998).
85. See U.C.C. § 2-208 (2003) (listing the interpretative hierarchy among course of
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade).
86. 159 Eng. Rep. at 375.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 376.
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implicated and the RSI default would not apply. In that event, the court should
apply one or more of the existing principles of general contract interpretation, which
presumably are designed to further other concerns present in those types of cases.

IV. THE CASE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFIC INVESTMENT
Up to this point, we have discussed only those contracts in which one party
makes investments specific to the relationship. In many long-term contracts,
however, both parties invest. Although this type of contract is not the primary focus
of this Article, we present in this Part some preliminary thoughts on how the RSI
default might apply to this more complicated situation.
In a series of papers, economic theorists have specified conditions under
which optimal investment by both parties can be achieved. 91 The argument is subtle
and rests on some unrealistic assumptions about the law. The insight, however,
provides the building blocks for how contract doctrine might deal with long-term
contracts involving two-sided investments.
To illustrate, consider a buyer and a seller, both of whom make
investments specific to their ongoing relationship: a long-term contract under which
seller provides electronic components for use in laptop computers manufactured by
the buyer. The buyer may make modifications to the computer design that render
the laptops more compatible with the seller’s components, but at the same time
render the computers less compatible with other available components. Similarly,
the seller might redesign or relocate its manufacturing facilities to facilitate the
manufacture of these components for the buyer, but these changes are not
particularly useful for the components that the seller manufactures for clients other
than the buyer.
If the contract specifies the purchase price for a particular quantity of the
components — that is, a price-quantity pair -- then this represents the starting point
for any renegotiation. The models assume that the court will specifically enforce
this starting point (the first unreasonable assumption about the law). The models
also assume that the contract specifies that one party will get the entire surplus from
any renegotiation of the contract, referred to as the allocation of bargaining power in
the renegotiation. 92 Finally, they assume that parties can commit not to renegotiate
the bargaining power allocation. Such a commitment is very hard to enforce.
Operating under these assumptions, the parties are able to solve the twosided investment problem. The parties have two levers to play with (initial
allocation and ex post allocation of surplus) and two parties to incentivize. Hence, it
is not surprising that a contract can achieve first best. It works as follows: First, the
contract assigns the entire surplus from the renegotiation to the buyer. Since the
buyer is the residual claimant, he invests to make this surplus as large as possible.
Second, the parties set the initial allocation or starting point of the renegotiations to
motivate the seller. In general, the seller will have a tendency to invest too little,
realizing that the entire surplus will go to the buyer. But if the initial allocation or
starting point for renegotiation is a high enough quantity (which the seller can
specifically enforce), she will invest the optimal amount.
91
92

See Aghion et al., supra note 12; Chung, supra note 12.
Chung, supra note 12, at 1032.
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As noted in Part II.C. of the Article, however, explicit contractual terms are
not the only mechanism for defining terms such as these. Instead, contractual
default rules can and do define both the starting point for the negotiation and the
allocation of surplus in the absence of specific contractual provisions on these
points, albeit imprecisely. Contractual default rules and, specifically, the RSI default
sets the renegotiation bargaining power of the parties, by specifying the starting
positions from which they begin to renegotiate. What is needed to replicate the
solution offered by the economic models, then, is a way to assign the surplus from
the renegotiation to one party or the other.
To do this, one needs to know the factors that affect how parties split
surplus when bargaining. Economists have many models investigating this
problem. 93 The division of surplus usually hinges on the cost of disagreement and
the parties’ outside options. If either of these factors differs for the two parties, the
split of the surplus will differ. One way, then, to change the allocation of the
surplus from contract renegotiation is for the law to change the cost of disagreement
by treating the party’s claim differently (perhaps through different statute of
limitations or different damage remedies).
To illustrate, suppose that the seller could not get punitive damages for
breach of contract, but the buyer could. During renegotiation, the seller would be
more apt to settle, hoping to get the renegotiation accomplished and avoid the threat
of punitive damages. Knowing this, the buyer will offer the seller a smaller share of
the surplus from the renegotiation.
Although our work on the problem of two-sided relationship-specific
investment is still quite preliminary, the economic models suggest a tentative
doctrinal solution: Set the interpretative defaults to favor more trade, but treat the
remedy availability asymmetrically. Rarely, if ever, will the parties want to trade at
the quantity suggested in the contract, especially when all the interpretative
difficulties are resolved in favor of more trade. Instead, they will want to trade a
different, lower amount. More importantly, the parties will bargain over the surplus
gained by renegotiation. The asymmetric remedies ensure that the buyer receives
the majority of the surplus from the renegotiation. Knowing this, the buyer will
invest in making this surplus as big as possible. With the buyer’s investment taken
care of, the seller’s investment remains a concern. However, the interpretative
default solves this problem. By interpreting all language to favor higher trade, the
seller invests as if the quantity traded will be high.

V. INFORMATIONAL BURDENS OF THE RSI DEFAULT
To employ the RSI default, a court needs to know something about the
parties’ investments in the relationship. In the incomplete contracts literature,
however, the common assumption is that the parties cannot contract on
investments. 94 If, to the contrary, contracting on investments is easily accomplished,
then the problem of inefficient investment goes away because the contract itself
93
See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 Econometrica
97 (1982).
94. See HART, supra note 13, at 26-27. Indeed, in the formal model we built to check
the results in the paper, we do not assume that investment is observable or verifiable.
Instead, we suppose that the court observes some signal, which is correlated with
investment. The model is available at www.unc.law.edu/modelincompletecontracts.
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would specify the level of investment. A failure to invest up to the level called for in
the contract would constitute breach. Likewise, damages for investment above what
the contract specified would be limited by the contractual terms.
Economists suggest that problems of verification render investments
noncontractible. The typical model assumes that investments, while observable to
the parties ex post, are not verifiable to the court. Stated differently, parties cannot
prove breach of an investment commitment. Since parties cannot show breach, they
cannot specify and then enforce promises about investments.
The RSI default seems to run counter to this verifiability assumption,
because the court needs to observe the investment or a proxy for the investment in
order to apply the default. As other scholars have noted, there is not a clear
distinction between observability and verifiability. With enough money spent on
information collection, any action that is observable can be made verifiable. 95
If the court can observe and verify investments ex post, why are the parties
unable to contract on the investments initially and have the court enforce those
commitments? A critic might argue that, in the exact subset of contracts where the
RSI default applies, the parties could solve the investment problems themselves ex
ante at the contracting stage. As a result, the RSI default is unnecessary or even
harmful.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. In practice, there are many reasons
why parties fail to explicitly contract on investment levels that have nothing to do
with observability or verifiability. First, the parties might fail to specify investment
levels because the costs of drafting such provisions may be quite high. This is
especially true for parties to deals done under a time constraint. The drafting
problem is exacerbated when investment is multidimensional, requiring many
different levels of investment.
Second, raising the issue of investments during contract formation might
jeopardize completion of the deal. 96 A willingness to make relationship-specific
investments signals a level of commitment to the relationship. To avoid the danger
of negative signaling, parties might instead avoid the issue of investment (and other
difficult or contentious issues) during contract negotiation. Similarly, “agreeing to
agree” on investment levels lets parties work out the other details of the contract,
fostering some good will during the negotiation. 97
Third, the use of the RSI default occurs ex post as an interpretative or gapfilling device. The court need not decide whether the parties breached investment
promises. Instead, the court uses the investments or, more likely, proxies for
investments to nudge the interpretation or gap-filling rule in favor of one of the
parties. This is a much looser requirement than finding a contractual obligation
about investment levels or measuring them with certainty. As such, it requires less
in the way of information about actual investment levels. At summary judgment, the
parties can introduce evidence of investments undertaken and the amount of notice
given. As in all legal disputes, the other party can challenge these findings. The
court, then, decides whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant use of the RSI

95. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 93, at 14-21; Shavell, supra note 39, at 468.
See generally Ben-Shahar, supra note __ (discussing the reasons behind “agreements to
agree.”)
97
Id.
96
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default. When the contract has no RSIs or proxies for RSIs that are observable or
verifiable ex post, the RSI default does not apply.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RSI default does
not preclude the parties from explicitly contracting on investment
levels if they so desire. To the contrary, the notice requirement forces
parties to clarify the extent of their investment obligations early or
lose the benefits of the default rule, thus encouraging parties to
specify their agreement as fully as possible.

V. CONCLUSION
The literature on relationship-specific investment spans decades. This
Article links that literature to the legal scholarship on default rules to provide a
unified framework for thinking about good faith, contract interpretation, and gapfilling.
Contract doctrines provide the backdrop against which all contract
renegotiation occurs. As such, the doctrines can share a common underlying
function: the inducement of relationship-specific investment. The RSI default
pushes the doctrines in favor of the relationship-specific investor, while, at the same
time, reducing that party’s incentive to over-invest. The latter goal is accomplished
by requiring notice of the investment before the benefit of the default rule attaches.
The RSI insight can aid courts’ good faith analysis by moving that inquiry
beyond vague notions of fair dealing and opportunism and, instead, calls upon
courts to focus their attention on those conditions under which threats are credible
and opportunism is most likely to occur. Under the RSI default, a court makes a
finding of bad faith and sets aside a contract only if the parties prove that the
economic conditions needed for opportunistic behavior actually exist.

